Both countries lay claim to the Himalayan territory, split by an informal boundary, known as the Line of Control, since the first Indian-Pakistani war of First came a February suicide attack by Islamist militants against Indian paramilitaries in Kashmir.
India retaliated by bombing an alleged militant camp in Pakistan, prompting a Pakistani strike in Indian-controlled Kashmir.
Not only that: Before announcing its decision, it brought in tens of thousands of extra troops, imposed a communications blackout, and arrested thousands of Kashmiris, including the entire political class, many of whom were not hostile to India. These moves have exacerbated an already profound sentiment of alienation among Kashmiris that will likely further fuel a long-running separatist insurgency. Internet access remains cut off, soldiers deployed in August are still there, and all Kashmiri leaders remain in detention.
But its cause is hardly helped by its long record of backing anti-India jihadis. Moreover, most Western powers see New Delhi as an important partner. They are unlikely to rock the boat over Kashmir, unless violence spirals. The gravest danger is the risk that a militant attack sets off an escalation.
In Kashmir, insurgents are lying low but still active. A strike on Indian forces almost certainly would precipitate Indian retaliation against Pakistan, regardless of whether Islamabad is complicit in the plan. In a worst-case scenario, the two nuclear-armed neighbors could stumble into war. External actors should push for rapprochement before it is too late. Both sides are playing to domestic constituencies in no mood for compromise. Resuming bilateral dialogue, on hold since , is essential and will necessitate concerted pressure, particularly from Western governments.
Any progress requires Pakistan taking credible action against jihadis operating from its soil, a nonnegotiable precondition for India to even consider engaging. For its part, India should lift the communications blackout, release political prisoners, and urgently reengage with Kashmiri leaders. Both sides should resume cross-border trade and travel for Kashmiris. If a new crisis emerges, foreign powers will have to throw their full weight behind preserving peace on the disputed border.
But his government remains isolated and bereft of resources, while most Venezuelans suffer from crushing poverty and collapsing public services. Despite hardship, poor communities remained mostly unconvinced by the opposition. Gold exports and cash dollars kept the country afloat and enriched a tiny elite.
Many of those left out joined the mass exodus of Venezuelans, now numbering 4. The crisis is having other ripple effects. The United Nations estimates that 7 million Venezuelans need humanitarian aid, many of them in border areas patrolled by armed groups, including Colombian guerrillas. Though sharing more than 1, miles of criminalized, violent, and largely unguarded border, the Colombian and Venezuelan governments no longer talk to each other, instead trading insults and blame for sheltering armed proxies.
The omens are not overly promising. Government-opposition talks facilitated by Norway were suspended in September. But there is still a negotiated way out of the turmoil. It would entail compromise from all sides: The opposition would need to drop its demand that Maduro leave now; the government would have to accept steps ensuring a credible and internationally monitored parliamentary election in as well as an early—and equally credible— presidential poll in the near future; and the U.
A Ukrainian serviceman patrols along the front line with Russia-backed separatists not far from the town of Avdiivka, Donetsk region, on Nov. Yet if peace seems slightly more plausible than it did a year ago, it is far from preordained. Zelensky pledged while campaigning to make peace. He started by negotiating mutual withdrawals from front-line positions and a cease-fire with Russia and its proxies. The leaders failed to agree on Minsk sequencing but left with plans for a more comprehensive cease-fire, further disengagement at front-line positions, increased Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe monitoring, and new crossing points for civilians at the line of contact separating Ukrainian and separatist forces.
This gives him more room for maneuver. If things go as planned, the next meeting in France, set for spring, should tackle other components of the Minsk agreement, including amnesties, further troop withdrawals, and a path to reintegrating separatist-held areas into Ukraine. Much could go wrong. Cease-fire and disengagement plans might collapse and fighting could escalate. Even if they hold, Zelensky needs Moscow to compromise for peace to stand a chance. So far, however, although Moscow has been more amenable to deals with Zelensky than with his predecessor, its core positions remain unchanged: It denies being party to the conflict it initiated, fought in, and funded.
Peace would offer clear dividends for Ukraine and carry benefits for Russia: It could bring sanctions relief and remove the burden of financial and military support to separatist-held areas. From his Western allies, Zelensky needs all the help he can get as he continues his charm offensive in eastern Ukraine and outreach to Moscow. Shusha was the key to the recent war between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Now Baku wants to turn the fabled fortress town into a resort. As Washington overpromises and underdelivers, regional powers are seeking solutions on their own—both through violence and diplomacy. Or are they? The Month in World Photos. Analysis Richard Aboulafia. Argument Andrew Connelly. November 11, , PM. Washington pledged to withdraw troops from Afghanistan in return for Taliban commitments to forbid terrorists from using the country for operations and to enter talks with the Afghan government.
Afghan peace talks took time to get underway. The government stretched out for six months a prisoner exchange the U. The insurgents, who had initially reduced suicide bombings and assaults on cities and towns, responded to delays by stepping up attacks and assassinations. Negotiations eventually started in Doha in mid-September, but the two sides took until December to agree on procedural rules.
Neither shows much appetite for compromise. Bloodshed has, if anything, escalated. The Taliban appear to have abandoned any initial restraint.
Recent months have seen an uptick in suicide bombings and larger offensives on towns. One challenge lies in how the parties view talks. Kabul is publicly committed. Kabul has sought to slow-roll talks without openly crossing Washington.
In contrast, Taliban leaders believe their movement is ascendant. They perceive the U. Within insurgent ranks too, many fighters expect talks to deliver much of what they have fought for. Looming in May is the deadline set in the February deal for a complete U. Though Washington argues that was implicitly conditional on advances in Afghan peace talks, the Taliban would likely react angrily to major delays.
Since February, Trump has pulled out thousands of U. An initial drawdown to 8, was mandated in the bilateral agreement, but Trump has downsized to 4, and pledges to reach 2, before he leaves office. The extra, unconditional withdrawals have reinforced Taliban confidence and government disquiet.
His administration may want to condition the withdrawal on progress in talks. But it will take time for the Afghan parties to reach a settlement. Keeping a U. To complicate things further, Biden has expressed a preference for keeping several thousand counter-terrorism forces in Afghanistan. He may have to decide between that and a potentially successful peace process. A precipitous U. Conversely, a prolonged presence could prompt the Taliban to walk away from talks and intensify their attacks, provoking a major escalation.
Either would mean that marks the year Afghanistan loses its best shot at peace in a generation. On 4 November, Ethiopian federal forces began an assault on Tigray region after a deadly Tigrayan attack and takeover of federal military units in the region.
Much remains unclear, given a media blackout. But the violence has likely killed thousands of people, including many civilians; displaced more than a million internally; and led some 50, to flee to Sudan. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power in after protests largely driven by long-simmering anger at the then-ruling coalition, which had been in power since and which the TPLF dominated.
While many Ethiopians blame the TPLF for years of oppressive rule, the Tigrayan party is not alone in fearing that Abiy aims to do away with the system in a quest to centralise authority. The question now is what comes next. Federal forces advanced and took control of Mekelle and other cities relatively quickly. The central government is now appointing an interim regional government, has issued arrest warrants for Tigrayan officials and military officers, and appears to hope to persuade Tigrayans to abandon their erstwhile rulers.
Yet the TPLF has a strong grassroots network. There are disturbing signs. Reports suggest purges of Tigrayans from the army and their mistreatment elsewhere in the country.
Militias from Amhara region, which borders Tigray, have seized disputed territory held for the past three decades by Tigrayans. All this will fuel Tigrayan grievances and separatist sentiment.
If the federal government invests heavily in Tigray, works with the local civil service as it is rather than emptying it of the TPLF rank and file, stops the harassment of Tigrayans elsewhere, and runs disputed areas rather than leaving them to Amhara administrators, there might be some hope of peace. Absent that, the outlook is gloomy for a transition that inspired so much hope only a year ago. The crisis engulfing the Sahel region of North Africa continues to worsen, with inter-ethnic violence increasing and jihadists extending their reach.
Intensified French counter-terrorism operations in dealt the militants some blows, pummeling the local Islamic State affiliate and killing several al-Qaeda leaders.
Combined with jihadist infighting, they appear to have contributed to a decline in complex militant attacks against security forces. Indeed, the more foreign militaries pile in, the bloodier the region seems to become.
Nor have government authorities been able to reclaim rural areas lost to militants. Even where military pressure forces jihadists out, they tend to return when operations subside.
The conditions on which militants thrive are difficult to reverse. As a result, neither state nor customary authorities are able to calm increasing friction among communities, often over resources. All this is a boon for militants, who lend firepower and offer protection to locals or even step in to resolve disputes.
Even beyond rural areas, citizens are growing angrier at their governments. Similar discontent plagues Niger and Burkina Faso. Type: Civil War Tension between clashing political parties in Ethiopia escalated into a violent civil war in November Eritrea, which borders Ethiopia to the north, has also sent troops into the conflict. The violence has spilled over into neighboring countries, with isolated skirmishes taking place in Sudan and Somalia. Named the "Tigray War", after the region in which it began, the war had resulted in more than 9, documented casualties though some sources estimate more than 50, by September Reports indicate war crimes are common.
Type: Drug War The Mexican Drug War is an ongoing conflict between the Mexican government and multiple powerful and violent drug trafficking cartels. Peter Brecke, the author of the dataset, however acknowledges that the degree to which this is in fact achieved varies considerably across conflicts.
While indirect deaths represent a substantial proportion of the social costs of conflict, t here is a conceptual difficulty in drawing a consistent boundary between indirect deaths attributable to the conflict and those due to other factors. For instance, whilst famines are often triggered by conflicts, many factors contribute to their onset and severity, such as the level of sanitation or the transportation infrastructure present.
Brecke does not attempt to provide a clear-cut definition, and this conceptual boundary has been largely dictated by the available primary sources he used in each estimate. Nevertheless, as we would expect, the death rates reported in the Conflict Catalogue do come out the highest. Across the various sources there three broad kinds of violent event distinguished: state-based conflict, non-state conflict and one-sided violence.
The kind of event depends on the type of actors involved. Non-state actors are those that demonstrate a degree of coordinated military organisation but whose identity falls short of statehood.
Non-state conflicts are those between two or more non-state actors, with no state involvement. It is for this reason that they do not show the jump in that marks the Rwandan genocide. There are two major projects that gather on wars on a global scale for the post-war period and make their finding publicly available:.
This data set is the base for the annual publication of the Human Security Project and for most of the data in this post. Data on on civil conflicts for the period —99 was collected by Fearon and Laitin and can be found here.
Draft version We are currently working on a dataset of war and large-scale violent events over the long run. All our charts on War and Peace Battle-related deaths in state-based conflicts since Battle-related deaths in state-based conflicts since , by world region Conflict and terrorism deaths IHME, GBD to Conflict deaths per ,, World various sources Death rates from conflict and terrorism Deaths from conflict and terrorism IHME, GBD to GDP per capita vs State fragility Incidents of conflict and one-sided violence since Rate of violent deaths in conflicts and one-sided violence per , since State-based battle-related deaths per , since State-based conflicts since Terrorism deaths vs.
The past was not peaceful. England over the long run. Death rates from military conflicts in England, ss — Clark 2. The 20th Century. International battle deaths per , people, 20th Century — Acemoglu 4.
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