If Mr Smith is the only individual in the nation to possess the correct combination that will detonate a device that could kill thousands, then he becomes not only causally efficacious in the firing of a weapon of war, but also morally responsible; reasonably he also becomes a legitimate military target. His job effectively militarizes his status even though he does not bear arms.
At a deeper level, one can consider the role that civilians play in supporting an unjust war: to what extent are they morally culpable, and if they are culpable in giving moral, financial, or economic support to some extent, does that mean they may become legitimate targets?
This invokes the issue of collective versus individual responsibility that is in itself a complex topic but one that the principle of discrimination tries to circumvent by presenting guidelines for soldiers that keep their activity within the realms of war and its effects rather than murder.
It would be wrong, on the principle of discrimination, to group the enemy into one targetable mass of people — some can not be responsible for a war or its procedures, notably children. The second principle of just conduct is that any offensive action should remain strictly proportional to the objective desired.
This principle overlaps with the proportionality principle of just cause, but it is distinct enough to consider it in its own light. Proportionality for jus In bello requires tempering the extent and violence of warfare to minimize destruction and casualties. It is broadly utilitarian in that it seeks to minimize overall suffering, but it can also be understood from other moral perspectives, for instance, from harboring good will to all Kantian ethics , or acting virtuously Aristotelian ethics.
Whilst the consideration of discrimination focuses on who is a legitimate target of war, the principle of proportionality deals with what kind of force is morally permissible. In fighting a just war in which only military targets are attacked, it is still possible to breach morality by employing disproportionate force against an enemy. Whilst the earlier theoreticians, such as Thomas Aquinas, invoked the Christian concepts of charity and mercy, modern theorists may invoke either consequentialist or intrinsicist prescriptions, both of which remain problematic as the foregoing discussions have noted.
However, it does not seem morally reasonable to completely gun down a barely armed albeit belligerent tribe. At the battle of Omdurman in in the Sudan, six machine gunners killed thousands of dervishes—the gunners may have been in the right to defend themselves, but the principle of proportionality implies that a battle end before it becomes a massacre.
What if a war and all of its suffering could be avoided by highly selective killing? Could just war theory endorse assassination for instance? The CIA manual on assassination , cf. Belfield , sought to distinguish between murder and assassination, the latter being justifiable according to the higher purposes sought. This is analogous to just war theorists seeking to put mass killing on a higher moral ground than pure massacre and slaughter and is fraught with the same problems raised in this article and in the just war literature.
On grounds of discrimination, assassination would be justifiable if the target were legitimate and not, say, the wife or children of a legitimate target. On grounds of proportionality, the policy would also be acceptable, for if one man or woman a legitimate target by virtue of his or her aggression should die to avoid further bloodshed or to secure a quicker victory, then surely assassination is covered by the just war theory? The founder of the Hashshashin society c.
Once initiated, assassination tends to become the norm of political affairs — indeed, civil politics would thus crumble into fearful and barbaric plots and conspiracies as did Rome in its last centuries in a race to gain power and mastery over others rather than to forge justifiable sovereignty.
Accordingly, they are complemented by other considerations that are not always explicitly taken up in the traditional exposition of jus In bello , this is especially true in the case of the issue of responsibility. Jus in bello requires that the agents of war be held responsible for their actions. This ties in their actions to morality generally. Readily it can be accepted that soldiers killing other soldiers is part of the nature of warfare for which soldiers ought to be prepared and trained, but when soldiers turn their weapons against non-combatants, or pursue their enemy beyond what is reasonable, then they are no longer committing legitimate acts of war but acts of murder.
The principle of responsibility re-asserts the burden of abiding by rules in times of peace on those acting in war to remind them that one day they will once more take up civilian status and should be prepared to do so conscientiously, free of any guilt from war crimes. Responsibility for acts of war relate back to the tenets of jus ad bellum as well as jus in bello , for the justification of going to war involves responsibility as well as the acts ordered and committed in war.
The aftermath of war involves the relinquishing of armed conflict as a means of resolving disputes and the donning of more civil modes of conduct but it also raises questions concerning the nature of the post bellum justice.
Following the cessation of a war, three possibilities emerge: either the army has been defeated, has been victorious, or it has agreed to a ceasefire. Principles of justice may then be applied to each situation. It has often been remarked that justice, like history, is written by the victors. A defeated army and indeed the civilian body from which the army stems should thus be prepared to subject itself to the imposition of rules and forms of punishments, humiliation, and even retributions that it would not otherwise agree to.
The lives, values, and resources that have been fought for must now be handed over to the conquerors. The just war theorist is keen to remind warriors and politicians alike that the principles of justice following war should be universalizable and morally ordered and that victory should not provide a license for imposing unduly harsh or punitive measures or that state or commercial interests should not dictate the form of the new peace.
In post-war Iraq date , the rehabilitation programs have met with mixed success and have often been criticized for favoring some ethnic groups over others, i. Criticism may stem from either intrinsicist reasons that the defeated should still be viewed as a people deserving moral respect and their traditions held as sacrosanct or consequentialist reasons that punitive impositions are likely to produce a backlash ; but again it is worth reminding that just war theory tends to merge the two to avoid awkward implications derived from either position singly.
At this point, the attraction for jus post bellum thinkers is to return to the initial justice of the war. Consider a war of self-defense: this is considered by most, except absolute pacifists, to be the most justifiable of all wars. If the people are defeated but their cause remains just, should they then continue the fight to rid their country of all the vestiges of occupation?
What if fighting is impossible? A realist, however, may ask how a people are to regain their freedom if they do not raise arms against their sea of troubles? Others may counsel civil disobedience and other forms of intransigence to signal displeasure.
The aggressor, one who initiates war, puts the individual or the community into a state of war, he argues, and so the defender has an absolute prerogative to use whatever force necessary to secure freedom and peace: accordingly, in victory, the victors may enslave or kill the aggressors. Indeed, King Alfred the Great of Wessex c.
Here we enter the debates regarding punishment: does punishing a violator make any sense except to exact either retribution, revenge, or to promote a deterrence? Can the victors be sure of their claim to punish the aggressors and what good could possibly flow from bringing more violence or enslavement to the world? In asserting the need to find universalisable principles, the just war theorist is usually keen to insist that any war crimes trials are held in neutral states and presided over by neutral parties, rather than the victors whose partiality in proceedings must be presumed: after all, in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, no allied generals or politicians were held accountable for the atrocities created by bombing civilian centers in Germany and Japan and the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The end game and hence the jus post bellum certainly merit attention before the battles are lost or won: what should be the ruling affairs once the peace is proclaimed?
Is it right that an army should demand unconditional surrender, for instance, when such a policy may entail a protracted war for no incentive is given to the other side to surrender; on the other hand, unconditional surrender implies a derogatory view of the enemy as one not to be respected either in or after war.
Yet if an unconditional surrender policy does suitably raise the stakes of fighting war it may act as a sufficient deterrent against possible aggressors or act as a useful diplomatic tool to bring a worried enemy back to peaceful overtures.
Similarly, is it right that an army should demand reparations in advance rather than leave them undisclosed and thereby risk the uncertainty of punishment creating a backlash from the defeated, who may not wish to be so subjected?
Of course, if promises of an amnesty or fair treatment of prisoners is reneged on by the victor, then all trust for future arrangements is lost and the consequences imply embedding hatreds and mistrust for generations. Assume that victory is given, that the army has defeated its enemy on the battlefield so attention turns to the nature of the post bellum justice of dealing with the defeated regardless of its intentions beforehand.
Consider the demands for reparations. A defeated aggressor may just be asked to pay for the damage incurred by the war as justice demands of criminals that they pay for their crimes. But to what extent should the reparations extend? Should a war be indecisive though, the character of the peace would presumably be formed by the character of the ceasefire — namely, the cessation of fighting would imply a mere hiatus in which the belligerents regain the time and resources to stock their defenses and prepare for further fighting.
As such, a ceasefire would be merely a respite for the military to regain its strengths. However, just war theory also acts to remind contenders that war is a last resort and that its essential aim is always peace, so if peace is forthcoming in any guise, it is morally critical for all parties to seek a return to a permanent peace rather than a momentary lapse of war.
This article has described the main tenets of the just war theory, as well as some of the problems that it entails. The theory bridges theoretical and applied ethics, since it demands an adherence, or at least a consideration of meta-ethical conditions and models, as well as prompting concern for the practicalities of war. A few of those practicalities have been mentioned here.
Other areas of interest are: hostages, innocent threats, international blockades, sieges, the use of weapons of mass destruction or of anti-personnel weapons for example, land mines , and the morality and practicalities of interventionism. Alexander Moseley Email: alexandermoseley icloud. Just War Theory Just war theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought.
Introduction Historically, the just war tradition—a set of mutually agreed rules of combat—may be said to commonly evolve between two culturally similar enemies. The Jus Ad Bellum Convention The principles of the justice of war are commonly held to be: having just cause, being a last resort, being declared by a proper authority, possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, and the end being proportional to the means used. The Principles Of Jus In Bello The rules of just conduct within war fall under the two broad principles of discrimination and proportionality.
Jus post bellum Following the cessation of a war, three possibilities emerge: either the army has been defeated, has been victorious, or it has agreed to a ceasefire. Conclusion This article has described the main tenets of the just war theory, as well as some of the problems that it entails.
References and Further Reading Anscombe, Elizabeth. In Ethics, Religion, and Politics. University of Minnesota Press. Aquinas, St Thomas. Politics and Ethics. Augustine, St. City of God.
Belfield, Richard Any type of essay. War is an inevitable death to the mankind. Unlike usual events, war is an action of people imposed on other people. Occasionally this bitter and brutal war; came through the ethnic tensions between the majority and minority, which are making gigantic difficulties till today.
War is by usually carries feel of criminal, but can it ever be less criminal? Nations across the World comes up with many solutions, influences and assumption. Actually, War is inevitable; can it ever judge as morally justified? Besides war has made unusual impacts to the society in different ways; It has positive efforts to create peace and freedom; but also packed with many difficulties and effects to the many ethnic groups and cultural beliefs.
Pacific part of the world debates to not to justify war, while others argues to support it. All these facts prove one decent habit, inherits to the mankind. War eliminates hopes and dreams of millions, extinguishes of homelands, terrifies and dominates the population.
None of this, in the end, brings more corruption than it doing moral effect to the society. If someone influence soldiers to obey orders and execute cruelly in wars, particular party annihilate their natural reflexes of kindness and their capability of thinking and act freely by producing humble works for leaders.
Nobody has the right to execute a living individual. War can terminate the will to live; in those whose survives have been affected by it, and pretend to kill the others those forced to kill purposely.
It often keeps civilians working hard without giving them any direct rewards. Many countries over-spend on labour and resources to meet ongoing war needs, depriving their population of other necessities. This economic deprivation can take years to recover from. If the outcome of war brings more good than harm, war can be justified; even if the actual reason for war is not a morally acceptable one.
Anything that, on a worldwide scale, improves the quality of life for the majority is acceptable. If the evils a war is fought against, like racism or terrorism, are universally immoral, war is also acceptable. Going to war to protect the innocent and persecuted or to attain freedom and human rights is acceptable because no person should be denied these basic privileges.
As long as a war does not injure the innocent and deny other parties these rights, then it should continue and make life worth living for the persecuted people. Wars that are fought to stop the advance of a morally corrupt power are justifiable, because they are destroying an evil that would cause suffering to a greater number in the long run. War in self-defence cannot be argued against, as otherwise, you are vulnerable. Finally, going to war as an ally is justifiable because of the fundamental decency to aid and be loyal to those who would return the support.
However, it is controversial as to whether countries at which a war is not directed at should join that war: they often worsen the situation by interfering. And that can lead to massive blunders, as we saw very vividly in the arguments leading up to the start of the Iraq War in — arguments that Biggar exhaustively reconstructs in an unfortunate page chapter that ends with him pronouncing that, all things considered, the war was morally justified. I'm going to go out on a limb here and simply declare that any moral calculus that gives such a result is effectively worthless.
One would think that at this late date it would be unnecessary to list the reasons why. But apparently not. Here, then, are merely a few, using Biggar's own just war criteria as a method of evaluation. There was no atrocity underway in Iraq during the spring of , and so there were no innocents to protect from unjust aggression.
Unless, of course, we expand the term "atrocity" to include the injustices endured by everyone living under a tyrant, in which case the list of just wars would be very long indeed. As Saddam Hussein's actions during the Gulf War made clear, he was deterrable. The fact that after the invasion he was found to possess no weapons of mass destruction provides further, retrospective justification of this view.
This means that war was not undertaken as a last resort. The fact that he was deterrable and possessed no weapons of mass destruction means that he posed no significant threat to us or our allies. This means that the war was not defensive. Estimates of violent deaths in Iraq as a direct or indirect result of the invasion and occupation of the country range from just over , to more than 1 million. Those deaths continue , by the way, right down to the present.
Even if we side with the lower estimates and assume roughly , civilian deaths, there is no plausible scenario in which anywhere close to that number of people would have been killed if we had left Saddam Hussein in power. So much for evils of omission. A final consideration. Americans sometimes worry about the risks and costs involved in the United States acting as the world's policeman. But what advocates of just war reasoning have in mind is far more sweeping.
They would empower the U. Read Biggar on how war can and should have a "punitive" dimension. This is an extremely bad idea. Americans are already too inclined to believe in their own righteousness. Their tendency toward what Alexis de Tocqueville called "the perpetual utterance of self-applause" often leads them to make foolish mistakes. They certainly don't need theologians telling them that their good intentions entitle them, over the inevitable objections of billions of their would-be subjects, to appoint themselves the world's benevolent despot.
In a future column, I will examine the religious sources of just war thinking and ask whether it deserves to be considered Christian at all. Skip to header Skip to main content Skip to footer Opinion. True enough: evil arises from both acts of commission and acts of omission.
There are just two problems. Nothing good can come of that. More From
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