But I know that to accomplish this is not easy—I quite see the nature of the task. Let the event be as the god wills: in obedience to the law [ nomos ] I make my defense. I will begin at the beginning, and ask what the accusation is [19b] which has given rise to this slander of me, and which has encouraged Meletus to proceed against me. What do the slanderers say?
They shall be my prosecutors, and I will sum up their words in an affidavit. I should be very sorry if Meletus could lay that to my charge. But the simple truth is, O Athenians, that I have nothing to do with these studies. Speak then, you who have heard me, and tell your neighbors whether any of you have ever known me hold forth in few words or in many upon matters of this sort. And from what they say of this you will be able to judge of the truth of the rest.
Although, if a man is able to teach, I honor him for being paid. There is Gorgias of Leontini, and Prodicus of Ceos, and Hippias of Elis, who go the round of the cities, and are able to persuade the young men to leave their own citizens [of the polis ], by whom they might be taught for nothing, [20a] and come to them, whom they not only pay, but are thankful [full of kharis ] if they may be allowed to pay them.
You must have thought about this as you have sons; is there anyone? Had I the same, I should have been very proud and conceited; but the truth is that I have no knowledge of the kind. All this great fame and talk about you would never have arisen if you had been like other men: tell us, then, [20d] why this is, as we should be sorry to judge hastily of you.
Please to attend then. And here, O men of Athens, I must beg you not to interrupt me, even if I seem to say something extravagant. For the word which I will speak is not mine.
You must have known Chaerephon; [21a] he was early a friend of mine, and also a friend of yours, for he shared in the exile of the people, and returned with you. Well, Chaerephon, as you know, was very impetuous in all his doings, and he went to Delphi and boldly asked the oracle [ manteuesthai ] to tell him whether—as I was saying, I must beg you not to interrupt—he asked the oracle to tell him whether there was anyone wiser [more sophos ] than I, and the Pythian prophetess answered that there was no man wiser [more sophos.
Because I am going to explain to you why I have such an evil name. What can he mean when he says that I am the wisest [most sophos ] of men? I reflected that if I could only find a man more sophos than myself, [21c] then I might go to the god with a refutation of the oracle [ manteion ] in my hand.
So I left him, saying to myself, as I went away: Well, although I do not suppose that either of us knows anything really beautiful and good [ agathos ], I am better off than he is—for he knows nothing, and thinks that he knows. I neither know nor think that I know. In this latter particular, then, I seem to be slightly more sophos than him. I made another enemy of him, and of many others besides him. After this I went to one man after another, being not unconscious of the enmity which I provoked, and I lamented and feared this: but necessity was laid upon me—the word of the god, I thought, ought to be considered first.
And I said to myself, Go I must to all who appear to know, and find out the meaning of the oracle. When I left the politicians, I went to the poets; tragic, dithyrambic, [22b] and all sorts. And there, I said to myself, you will be detected; now you will find out that you are more ignorant than they are. Accordingly, I took them some of the most elaborate passages in their own writings, and asked what was the meaning of them—thinking that they would teach me something.
Will you believe me? And the poets appeared to me to be much in the same case [literally have the same pathos, experience]; and I further observed that upon the strength of their poetry they believed themselves to be the most sophos of men in other things in which they were not sophos.
So I departed, conceiving myself to be superior to them for the same reason that I was superior to the politicians.
At last I went to the artisans, [22d] for I was conscious that I knew nothing at all, as I may say, and I was sure that they knew many fine [ kala ] things; and in this I was not mistaken, for they did know many things of which I was ignorant, and in this they certainly were more sophos than I was. And this is the reason why my three accusers, Meletus and Anytus and Lycon, have set upon me; Meletus, who has a quarrel with me on behalf of the poets; Anytus, on behalf of the craftsmen; [24a] Lycon, on behalf of the rhetoricians: and as I said at the beginning, I cannot expect to get rid of this mass of calumny all in a moment.
I have said enough in my defense against the first class of my accusers; I turn to the second class, who are headed by Meletus, that good [ agathos ] and patriotic man, as he calls himself. And now I will try to defend myself against them: these new accusers must also have their affidavit read. What do they say? Something of this sort: that Socrates commits wrong [ a-dika ] deeds, and corrupts the young men, [24c] and he does not believe in the gods that the state [ polis ] believes in, but believes in other things having to do with daimones of his own.
That is the sort of charge; and now let us examine the particular counts. And the truth of this I will endeavor to prove. Come here, Meletus, and let me ask a question of you. Socrates Tell the judges, then, who is their improver; for you must know, as you have taken the pains to discover their corrupter, and are citing and accusing me before them. Speak, then, and tell the judges who their improver is. Observe, Meletus, that you are silent, and have nothing to say.
But is not this rather disgraceful, and a very considerable proof of what I was saying, that you have no interest in the matter? Speak up, friend, and tell us who their improver is. Socrates [24e] But that, my good sir, is not my meaning.
I want to know who the person is, who, in the first place, knows the laws [ nomoi ]. Socrates What do you mean to say, Meletus, that they are able to instruct and improve youth? Socrates By the goddess Hera, that is good news! There are plenty of improvers, then. And what do you say of the audience—do they improve them? Socrates But perhaps the members of the citizen assembly corrupt them—or do they too improve them? Socrates Then every Athenian improves and elevates them; all with the exception of myself; and I alone am their corrupter?
Is that what you affirm? Socrates I am very unfortunate if that is true. But suppose I ask you a question: Would you say that this also holds true in the case of horses? Is not the exact opposite of this true? One man is able to do them good, or at least not many—the trainer of horses, that is to say, does them good, and others who have to do with them rather injure them?
Is not that true, Meletus, of horses, or any other animals? Yes, certainly; whether you and Anytus say yes or no, that is no matter. And now, Meletus, I must ask you another question: Which is better, to live among bad citizens, or among good ones?
Answer, friend, I say; for that is a question which may be easily answered. Do not the good [ agathoi ] do their neighbors good [ agathon ], and the bad do them evil? Socrates [25d] And is there anyone who would rather be injured than benefited by those who live with him? Answer, my good friend; the law [ nomos ] requires you to answer—does anyone like to be injured? Socrates And when you accuse me of corrupting and deteriorating the youth, do you allege that I corrupt them intentionally or unintentionally?
Socrates But you have just admitted that the good [ agathoi ] do their neighbors good [ agathon ], and the evil do them evil. But either I do not corrupt them, [26a] or I corrupt them unintentionally, so that on either view of the case you lie. If my offence is unintentional, the law [ nomos ] has no cognizance of unintentional offences: you ought to have taken me privately, and warned and admonished me; for if I had been better advised, I should have left off doing what I only did unintentionally—no doubt I should; whereas you hated to converse with me or teach me, but you indicted me in this court, where the law [ nomos ] demands not instruction, but punishment.
I have shown, Athenians, as I was saying, [26b] that Meletus has no care at all, great or small, about the matter. But still I should like to know, Meletus, in what I am affirmed to corrupt the young.
I suppose you mean, as I infer from your indictment, that I teach them not to acknowledge the gods which the state [ polis ] acknowledges, but some other new divinities or spiritual agencies [ daimones ] in their stead.
These are the lessons which corrupt the youth, as you say. Socrates Then, by the gods, Meletus, of whom we are speaking, tell me and the court, in somewhat plainer terms, what you mean!
Or, do you mean to say that I am an atheist simply, and a teacher of atheism? Socrates [26d] That is an extraordinary statement, Meletus. Why do you say that? Do you mean that I do not believe in the divinity of the sun or moon, which is the common creed of all men?
Meletus I assure you, judges, that he does not believe in them; for he says that the sun is stone, and the moon earth. Socrates Friend Meletus, you think that you are accusing Anaxagoras; and you have but a bad opinion of the judges, if you fancy them ignorant to such a degree as not to know that those doctrines are found in the books of Anaxagoras of Klazomenai, who is full of them. And these are the doctrines which the youth are said to learn of Socrates, when there are not infrequently exhibitions of them at the theatre price of admission one drachma at the most ; [26e] and they might cheaply purchase them, and laugh at Socrates if he pretends to father such eccentricities.
And so, Meletus, you really think that I do not believe in any god? Socrates You are a liar, Meletus, not believed even by yourself. For I cannot help thinking, O men of Athens, that Meletus is full of insolence [ hubris ] and impudent, and that he has written this indictment in a spirit of mere wantonness and youthful bravado.
I should like you, O men of Athens, to join me in examining what I conceive to be his inconsistency; and do you, Meletus, answer. Did ever man, Meletus, believe in the existence of human things, and not of human beings? Did ever any man believe in horsemanship, and not in horses? No, my friend; I will answer to you and to the court, as you refuse to answer for yourself.
There is no man who ever did. But now please answer the next question: [27c] Can a man believe in things having to do with daimones , and not in the daimones themselves? Socrates I am glad that I have extracted that answer, by the assistance of the court; nevertheless you swear in the indictment that I teach and believe in things related to daimones— things new or old, no matter—at any rate, I believe in things related to daimones , as you say and swear in the affidavit.
But if I believe in things related to daimones , I must believe in daimones or gods themselves—is not that true? Yes, that is true, for I may assume that your silence gives assent to that. Now what are daimones? Socrates But this is just the ingenious riddle [ ainigma ] of which I was speaking: the daimones are gods, and you say first that I do not believe in gods, and then again that I do believe in gods; that is, if I believe in daimones.
For if the daimones are the illegitimate children of gods, whether by the Nymphs or by any other mothers, as is thought, that, as all men will allow, necessarily implies the existence of their parents. Such nonsense, Meletus, could only have been devised by you as a way to charge me. I have said enough in answer to the charge of Meletus. Any elaborate defense is unnecessary; but as I was saying before, I certainly have many enemies, and this is what will be my destruction if I am destroyed; of that I am certain—not Meletus, nor yet Anytus, but the envy and detraction of the world, which has been the death of many good [ agathos ] men, and will probably be the death of many more; [28b] there is no danger of my being the last of them.
Perhaps someone might say: And are you not ashamed, Socrates, of pursuing such a goal in life, which is likely to cause you to die right now? Rather, he should only consider whether in doing anything he is doing things that are just [ dikaia ] or unjust [ adika ], acting the part of a good [ agathos ] man or of a bad [ kakos ] one.
His mother, goddess that she was, had said to him, when he was showing his eagerness to slay Hector, something like this, I think: My child, if you avenge the slaying of your comrade [ hetairos ] Patroklos and kill Hector, you will die yourself.
And this is the point in which, as I think, I am superior to men in general, and in which I might perhaps fancy myself more sophos than other men—that whereas I know but little of the world below, I do not suppose that I know: but I do know that injustice and disobedience to a better, whether god or man, is evil [ kakos ] and dishonorable, and I will never fear or avoid a possible good rather than a certain evil.
Are you not ashamed of this? And this I should say to everyone whom I meet, young and old, citizen and alien [ xenos ], but especially to the citizens, inasmuch as they are my brethren. For this is the command of the god, as I would have you know; and I believe that to this day no greater good [ agathos ] has ever happened in the state than my service to the god.
This is my teaching, and if this is the doctrine which corrupts the youth, my influence is ruinous indeed. But if anyone says that this is not my teaching, he is speaking an untruth.
Wherefore, O men of Athens, I say to you, do as Anytus bids or not as Anytus bids, and either acquit me or not; [30c] but whatever you do, know that I shall never alter my ways, not even if I have to die many times. Men of Athens, do not interrupt, but hear me; there was an agreement between us that you should hear me out. And I think that what I am going to say will do you good: for I have something more to say, at which you may be inclined to cry out; but I beg that you will not do this.
I would have you know that, if you kill such a one as I am, you will injure yourselves more than you will injure me. Meletus and Anytus will not injure me: they cannot; for it is not in the nature of things [ themis ] [30d] that a bad man should injure a better than himself.
And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against the god, or lightly reject his boon by condemning me. I am that gadfly which the god has given the state and [31a] all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you.
And as you will not easily find another like me, I would advise you to spare me. I dare say that you may feel irritated at being suddenly awakened when you are caught napping; and you may think that if you were to strike me dead, as Anytus advises, which you easily might, then you would sleep on for the remainder of your lives, unless the god in his care of you gives you another gadfly.
And had I gained anything, or if my exhortations had been paid, there would have been some sense in that: but now, as you will perceive, not even the impudence of my accusers dares to say [31c] that I have ever exacted or sought pay of anyone; they have no witness of that. Someone may wonder why I go about in private, giving advice and busying myself with the concerns of others, but do not venture to come forward in public and advise the state.
You have often heard me speak [31d] of something related to the gods and to the daimones , a voice, which comes to me, and is the thing that Meletus ridicules in the indictment. This thing I have had ever since I was a child: it is a voice which comes to me and always forbids me to do something which I am going to do, but never commands me to do anything, and this is what stands in the way of being engaged in matters of the state.
And rightly, as I think. These activities earned him much admiration amongst the youth of Athens, but much hatred and anger from the people he embarrassed.
He cites their contempt as the reason for his being put on trial. Socrates then proceeds to interrogate Meletus, the man primarily responsible for bringing Socrates before the jury. This is the only instance in The Apology of the elenchus, or cross-examination, which is so central to most Platonic dialogues. His conversation with Meletus, however, is a poor example of this method, as it seems more directed toward embarrassing Meletus than toward arriving at the truth.
In a famous passage, Socrates likens himself to a gadfly stinging the lazy horse which is the Athenian state. Without him, Socrates claims, the state is liable to drift into a deep sleep, but through his influence--irritating as it may be to some--it can be wakened into productive and virtuous action.
Socrates is found guilty by a narrow margin and is asked to propose a penalty. Socrates jokingly suggests that if he were to get what he deserves, he should be honored with a great meal for being of such service to the state. On a more serious note, he rejects prison and exile, offering perhaps instead to pay a fine.
When the jury rejects his suggestion and sentences him to death, Socrates stoically accepts the verdict with the observation that no one but the gods know what happens after death and so it would be foolish to fear what one does not know. He also warns the jurymen who voted against him that in silencing their critic rather than listening to him, they have harmed themselves much more than they have harmed him.
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